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Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City 
of San Francisco: How the Ninth Circuit Abandoned  
Judicial Neutrality to Strike a Blow at Religion 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several decades, America has seen an ongoing 
conflict between advocates of gay rights and supporters of traditional 
religion.1 This conflict, one of many fronts in the “culture war,” as it 
has sometimes been called,2 has raged in many different contexts 
through the years.3 In the political arena and in the courts, religion 
and the gay movement have battled intensely over issues such as 
treatment of homosexuality in public schools, portrayal of 
homosexuality in media,4 and, more recently, gay marriage and the 
adoption of children by gay and lesbian couples.5 Because the 
conflict involves differing views about some of the most fundamental 
societal ideals and values,6 local governments have sometimes felt the 
need to step into the debate. Such involvement presents particularly 
difficult questions in trying to balance the free-speech interests of the 
government with the First Amendment protections afforded 
religious institutions.7 
On June 3, 2009, in Catholic League for Religious and Civil 
Rights v. City of San Francisco,8 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether a San 
Francisco city resolution denouncing a Vatican order not to place 
adoptive children with same-sex couples was forbidden under the 
 
 1. George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom, 
95 KY. L.J. 553, 555 (2007). 
 2. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);  
Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(Noonan, J., dissenting). 
 3. Dent, supra note 1, at 555. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Jason Scott, One State, Two State; Red State, Blue State: An Analysis of LGBT 
Equal Rights, 77 UMKC L. REV. 513, 517–18 (2008).  
 6. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 
42 (1991). 
 7. See Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights 
Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 394 (1994).  
 8. 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Applying the Lemon 
test, an analysis commonly used by courts in Establishment Clause 
cases, the Ninth Circuit found that the resolution passed 
constitutional scrutiny, despite Catholic League’s contention that the 
city was expressing disapproval of Catholicism in violation of the 
Constitution.9 This Note will argue that the Ninth Circuit 
incorrectly decided the case by applying an inherently problematic 
test, conducting an outcome-driven analysis, and ignoring the 
correct standard of review. In so doing, the court has arguably 
sacrificed its required neutrality. 
This Note will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Catholic 
League and explain how the court’s neutrality was compromised. 
Part II of the Note presents a summary of the facts and procedural 
history of the case. Part III then provides some context for the issues 
involved by discussing the background First Amendment 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence leading up to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision. Part IV describes the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and 
decision in Catholic League in detail, and Part V analyzes that 
decision to explain how the Ninth Circuit went wrong. Finally, Part 
VI offers a brief conclusion. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In March of 2006, the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco 
adopted a non-binding resolution concerning the Catholic Church’s 
position against adoptions of children by same-sex couples.10 The 
resolution, entitled “Resolution urging Cardinal Levada to withdraw 
his directive to Catholic Charities forbidding the placement of 
children in need of adoption with same-sex couples,” aimed harsh 
language at both the Vatican and Prefect Cardinal William Levada, 
who was the head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
at the Vatican.11 Passed in response to a then-recent directive from 
Cardinal Levada instructing the Archdiocese of San Francisco that 
Catholic social services agencies should not place children in need of 
 
 9. Id. at 597. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 597–98. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is an official body 
within the Catholic Church tasked with promoting and safeguarding the doctrine on faith and 
morals throughout the Catholic world. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:17 PM 
101 How the Ninth Circuit Abandoned Judicial Neutrality 
 103 
adoption with gay or lesbian couples,12 the full text of the resolution 
read as follows: 
Resolution urging Cardinal William Levada, in his capacity as head 
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith at the Vatican, to 
withdraw his discriminatory and defamatory directive that Catholic 
Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco stop placing children 
in need of adoption with homosexual households. 
WHEREAS, It is an insult to all San Franciscans when a foreign 
country, like the Vatican, meddles with and attempts to negatively 
influence this great City’s existing and established customs and 
traditions such as the right of same-sex couples to adopt and care 
for children in need; and 
WHEREAS, The statements of Cardinal Levada and the Vatican 
that “Catholic agencies should not place children for adoption in 
homosexual households,” and “Allowing children to be adopted by 
persons living in such unions would actually mean doing violence 
to these children”13 are absolutely unacceptable to the citizenry of 
San Francisco; and 
WHEREAS, Such hateful and discriminatory rhetoric is both 
insulting and callous, and shows a level of insensitivity and 
ignorance which has seldom been encountered by this Board of 
Supervisors; and 
WHEREAS, Same-sex couples are just as qualified to be parents as 
are heterosexual couples; and 
WHEREAS, Cardinal Levada is a decidedly unqualified 
representative of his former home city, and of the people of San 
Francisco and the values they hold dear; and 
WHEREAS, The Board of Supervisors urges Archbishop 
Niederauer and the Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San 
Francisco to defy all discriminatory directives of Cardinal Levada; 
now, therefore, be it 
RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors urges Cardinal 
William Levada, in his capacity as head of the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith at the Vatican (formerly known as Holy 
Office of the Inquisition), to withdraw his discriminatory and 
 
 12. Id. at 598. 
 13. This language was allegedly taken from a 2003 document issued by the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, entitled “Considerations Regarding Proposals to 
Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons.” Id. 
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defamatory directive that Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of 
San Francisco stop placing children in need of adoption with 
homosexual households.14 
Not long after the Board adopted this resolution, Catholic 
League filed suit, claiming that the resolution violated the 
Establishment Clause by expressing hostility and disapproval towards 
the Catholic Church and its religious tenets.15 Catholic League 
sought nominal damages, a declaration that the resolution was 
unconstitutional, and a permanent injunction enjoining the 
resolution and other official resolutions, pronouncements, or 
declarations against Catholics and their religious beliefs.16 The Board 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the district 
court granted that motion.17 Catholic League then appealed from 
the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.18 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion,”19 and the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies that prohibition to governments of the states.20 
There is general agreement that the basic principle behind the 
Establishment Clause is separation of church and state. However, 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause by the courts has 
historically been ambiguous, leaving current jurisprudence in a 
“confused state.”21 The United States Supreme Court has applied a 
number of different criteria and tests in analyzing Establishment 
Clause cases over the years, none of which has been deemed 
controlling in every case.22 
The Supreme Court has clearly stated, however, that “the ‘First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and 
 
 14. Id. at 597–98 (footnote not in original). 
 15. Id. at 598. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 599. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 20. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 408 (2009). 
 21. Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose If You Choose Not to Play: Toward a More 
Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2006). 
 22. See id. at 8–9. 
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religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’”23 This requirement 
of neutrality means that government conduct towards religion “must 
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it 
constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.”24 As the 
Ninth Circuit noted in its Catholic League opinion, the majority of 
Establishment Clause cases brought before the courts have dealt with 
questions of whether governmental endorsement of religion exists.25 
The courts rarely need to determine whether government actions 
have effected a “disapproval of religion.”26 Nevertheless, it has long 
been recognized that “[government] may not establish a ‘religion of 
secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility 
to religion.”27 
Because government disapproval cases are rare, the Ninth Circuit 
had relatively little precedent to follow in deciding the Catholic 
League case; however, two cases were particularly important in the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis. The first, Lemon v. Kurtzman,28 sets forth 
the well-known Lemon test as one possible analysis to be used in 
evaluating Establishment Clause cases. The second, American Family 
Ass’n v. City of San Francisco,29 is a more recent Ninth Circuit case 
involving the application of the Lemon test to a question of 
government disapproval. Both of these cases are discussed briefly in 
turn. 
A. Lemon v. Kurtzman 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court considered whether 
two state statutes that provided government aid to church-related 
schools violated the Establishment Clause. One of the statutes gave 
funding to nonpublic schools for the cost of teachers’ salaries and 
 
 23. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).  
 24. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
 25. See Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City of San Francisco, 567 
F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). 
 28. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 29. 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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supplies.30 The other granted teachers in nonpublic schools a 
supplement equal to part of their salaries.31 
In evaluating the constitutionality of those statutes, the Supreme 
Court used an analysis that has become known as the Lemon test. 
Under the Lemon test, government action will pass scrutiny if it 
meets three conditions. First, the action must have a secular 
purpose.32 Second, its primary effect must not be to advance or to 
inhibit religion.33 Finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.”34 If a government action 
fails any of those conditions, the Lemon test declares the action to be 
unconstitutional.35 
Applying the test in Lemon, the Supreme Court determined that 
the challenged statutes could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
According to the Court, the statutes passed the first condition of 
having a secular purpose because they were intended to enhance the 
quality of secular education.36 The Court found it unnecessary to 
decide whether the statutes had the primary effect of advancing 
religion under the second condition, however, because the statutes 
failed the third and final part of the test by causing excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.37 
The Lemon test has survived several decades as an important test 
in Establishment Clause cases; however, it is not the only test the 
Supreme Court has used.38 In fact, the Court has stated that the 
Lemon test’s three criteria are “no more than helpful signposts.”39 
Nevertheless, it was the test the Ninth Circuit chose to apply in 
American Family Ass’n v. City of San Francisco. 
 
 30. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971). 
 31. Id. at 607. 
 32. Id. at 612. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 613. 
 35. Id. at 612–13. 
 36. Id. at 613. 
 37. Id. at 613–14. 
 38. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 485–87 (9th Cir. 2003) (summarizing 
several tests that the Supreme Court has applied in various Establishment Clause cases, 
including the “endorsement test” and the “coercion test”).  
 39. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). 
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B. American Family Ass’n v. City of San Francisco 
In 1998, several religious groups joined together to sponsor an 
advertising campaign aimed at reaching out to members of the 
homosexual community.40 The coalition placed an advertisement in a 
San Francisco newspaper which stated, among other things, that 
homosexuality is a sin that can be overcome with the help of Jesus 
Christ.41 The advertisement also expressed a desire to help 
homosexuals avoid the physical and emotional health risks associated 
with such behavior.42 
Not long after the advertisement appeared in the paper, the San 
Francisco Board of Supervisors sent a letter to the religious groups, 
denouncing their “hateful rhetoric” and claiming that “there is a 
direct correlation between [their] acts of discrimination . . . and the 
horrible crimes committed against gays and lesbians.”43 The Board 
also adopted two resolutions that alleged the groups’ advertisements 
to be “erroneous and full of lies,” and to be encouraging of 
oppression and violence toward gays and lesbians.44 The Board’s 
angry response to the advertisement prompted the religious groups 
to bring a lawsuit alleging unconstitutional government hostility 
towards religion.45 
In addressing the religious groups’ allegations, the Ninth Circuit 
applied the Lemon test. Although acknowledging that it had mostly 
been used in cases involving government giving preference to 
religion, the court said the Lemon test “accommodates the analysis of 
a claim brought under a hostility to religion theory as well.”46 
Analyzing the purpose factor of the test, the court found that a 
plausible secular purpose to protect homosexuals from violence 
existed in the Board’s actions.47 The court further found that the 
primary effect of those actions was to send a message promoting 
equality for gays and discouraging hate crimes against them.48 
 
 40. Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 41. Id. at 1119. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1119–20. 
 45. Id. at 1120. 
 46. Id. at 1121. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1122. 
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Finally, the court said the entanglement factor did not fit very well 
with the circumstances of the case and clearly did not present a 
serious issue.49 Thus, the religious groups had no case. 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
Seven years after American Family Ass’n, the Ninth Circuit’s 
three-judge panel in Catholic League also affirmed the district court’s 
ruling in favor of the San Francisco Board, holding that the 
controversial Board resolution did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.50 In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit followed the 
analysis it employed in its American Family Ass’n decision.51 As it 
had done in the prior case, the Ninth Circuit chose to apply the 
Lemon test, and conducted an analysis of whether the resolution 
violated any of that test’s three conditions.52 What follows is a brief 
summary of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and analysis, as well as 
Judge Berzon’s concurring opinion. 
A. Purpose 
In applying the Lemon test, the Ninth Circuit first considered 
whether the Board’s action of adopting the resolution had a secular 
purpose. Seeking to make this determination from the standpoint of 
an objective observer, the court first turned to the resolution’s text. 
Although the court acknowledged the strong language of the 
resolution, it also noted that both the title and preamble seemed to 
state a purpose to denounce discrimination in adoption.53 
Additionally, the court said, this same secular theme was interwoven 
throughout the resolution.54 Turning its attention to timing, the 
court next pointed out that the resolution was adopted within a 
short period after Cardinal Levada issued his directive to Catholic 
Charities.55 If the Board were trying to attack Catholic beliefs, the 
court suggested, it would have done so years before, when the 
 
 49. Id. at 1123. 
 50. Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 
595, 608 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 51. Id. at 599. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 601. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 601–02. 
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Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith had initially voiced its 
opposition to legalization of gay and lesbian unions.56 Given the fact 
that it did not do so, the court found it reasonable to think that the 
Board was simply responding to the adoption issue, focusing on the 
secular impact the Catholic policy would have on same-sex couples 
in the city.57 
The court also recognized in its analysis that what the Board may 
have considered to be a secular purpose, Catholic League considered 
hostile to Catholic religious tenets.58 Issues touching upon 
homosexuality are inherently difficult because they can involve the 
overlap of secular and religious interests, but the court said that “the 
government is not stripped of its secular purpose simply because the 
same concept can be construed as religious.”59 
B. Effect 
After determining that the Board had a secular purpose in 
adopting the resolution, the Ninth Circuit once again looked 
through the lens of the objective observer to examine the 
resolution’s actual effect. Here, however, the court thought it 
essential to use a “sufficiently broad lens.”60 While acknowledging 
that even a non-binding resolution could have the effect of 
conveying a hostile symbolic message, the court nevertheless 
emphasized that it is not enough that one might simply infer 
disapproval of Catholic religious tenets as one of the resolution’s 
messages; rather, a message of disapproval must be the primary 
effect.61 
According to the court, a person viewing the resolution as a 
whole, having an understanding of its context and unique 
circumstances, would not conclude that the primary effect of the 
resolution was religious.62 Pointing to statements in the resolution 
that could be taken as hostile to Catholic religious beliefs, the court 
said such statements “do[] not stand alone,” but rather are 
“embedded in the larger Resolution which is primarily a defense of 
 
 56. See id. at 602.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 603. 
 60. Id. at 605. 
 61. Id. at 605 n.11. 
 62. Id. at 606–07. 
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same-sex adoption.”63 Additionally, San Francisco’s “tradition of 
promoting and defending same-sex relationships,” as well as the 
Board’s “extensive and persistent practice of passing non-binding 
resolutions denouncing discrimination against gays and lesbians,” led 
the court to decide that an objective observer would understand the 
Board’s intent to defend the rights of same-sex families;64 therefore, 
the effect of the resolution would not be primarily religious. 
C. Entanglement 
The third and final step in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was to 
consider whether the resolution fostered excessive governmental 
entanglement with religion. Catholic League argued that the 
resolution failed this part of the test by taking an “official position on 
religious doctrine,” thus taking sides in a religious matter.65 The 
Ninth Circuit, however, was not persuaded. It concluded that the 
resolution was simply an expression of the Board’s secular view on 
same-sex adoption, a matter of public policy.66 Additionally, despite 
Catholic League’s contention that the resolution attempted to 
influence Church authority and meddle in Church affairs, the court 
noted that the Board did not attempt to codify or regulate beliefs in 
any way; thus, it did not cross the line of excessive entanglement.67 
That the resolution was non-binding was important to this 
conclusion. 
D. Judge Berzon’s Concurring Opinion 
Although the three-judge panel was unanimous in its decision 
that the resolution passed the Lemon test, Judge Berzon found the 
result “troublesome.”68 Recognizing that the resolutions in Catholic 
League and American Family are “near—if not at—the line” that 
separates establishment of a policy condemning religious beliefs, 
Judge Berzon wrote a brief, but significant, concurring opinion in 
which she offered a few “caveats” that she thought should be 
 
 63. Id. at 606. 
 64. Id. at 605–07. 
 65. Id. at 607. 
 66. Id. at 608. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 609 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
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attached to the court’s Catholic League decision.69 First, Judge 
Berzon said, it was significant that the resolution did not call for any 
regulation; it was mere governmental speech.70 Second, it appeared 
that the resolution was not broadcast to the public other than 
through the Board’s enactment of it.71 It had not been advertised, 
displayed prominently, or broadcast in any other “more intrusive and 
permanent way.”72 And finally, the resolution was “not repeated or 
pervasive, but discrete.”73 
According to Judge Berzon, if any one of these three factors 
were different, the case may have come out differently.74 But because 
the resolution appeared to be “passed but then left dormant,” it 
probably did not pervade public perception of Catholicism and 
therefore did not violate the Establishment Clause.75 
V. ANALYSIS 
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Catholic League more 
closely resembled taking sides in the culture war than in neutrally 
applying the law to the facts of the case. Because the court applied an 
inherently problematic test, employed an outcome-driven analysis, 
and ignored the appropriate legal standard, it reached an incorrect 
conclusion and decision. 
A. The Flawed Lemon Test 
The first mistake the court made was in choosing to use the 
Lemon test. As mentioned previously, application of the Lemon test is 
not mandatory. The Ninth Circuit seemed to use it largely to be 
consistent with its prior decision in American Family Ass’n.76 
However, there are significant neutrality problems with the Lemon 
test, as constitutional scholars have recognized for years.77 A number 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 77. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing works of various constitutional scholars “who have 
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of current and former Supreme Court justices have criticized the 
test,78 and the Supreme Court has sometimes declined to use it, 
choosing instead to apply other standards it has deemed more 
appropriate.79 
One of the main criticisms of the Lemon test has been that the 
distinctions courts make when applying the test are difficult to 
discern.80 The test has sometimes been used as a convenient weapon 
to strike down practices with which the courts disagree, and it has 
not been consistently applied in all circumstances.81 For example, the 
Tenth Circuit has held that the depiction of a Christian cross in one 
corner of a city seal failed the Lemon test because of its unmistakable 
religious significance and the city’s pervasive use of the seal, even 
though the seal allegedly symbolized the city’s unique history and 
heritage.82 The next year, the same court held that statutes requiring 
the printing of “In God we trust” on U.S. currency were valid under 
the Lemon test’s requirements.83 
It has also been suggested that the Lemon test is particularly 
unsuitable for use in cases involving government disapproval, as 
opposed to endorsement, of religion.84 One reason for this opinion is 
that government can easily mask a hostile act by construing it to have 
a legitimate secular purpose.85 Another possible reason, among 
others, may be that the primary-effects factor of the test does not 
lend itself to easy application and can easily be confused with and 
rely upon the purpose-prong analysis. Thus, if the court finds a 
 
criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines 
and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced.”). 
 78. See id. at 398–99 (identifying opinions of six Supreme Court Justices who have 
“personally driven pencils through the [Lemon test] creature’s heart,” mostly in response to the 
test’s ad hoc application). 
 79. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (“Whatever may be the fate 
of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not 
useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol 
grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our 
Nation's history.”). 
 80. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 419 (2009). 
 81. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 82. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 419 (2009) (citing Robinson v. City of 
Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
 83. Id. (citing Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 84. See Andrew R. Cogar, Note, Government Hostility to Religion: How Misconstruction 
of the Establishment Clause Stifles Religious Freedom, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 279, 307–08 (2002). 
 85. See id. at 309. 
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convincing secular purpose, it may be inclined to see a primarily 
secular effect as well. The Ninth Circuit should have taken the 
opportunity in Catholic League to address these flaws of the Lemon 
test in the present setting before blindly applying the test. 
B. An Outcome-Driven Analysis 
Because the Lemon test too easily makes it possible to apply an 
analysis that is oriented to fit a desired outcome, it is not surprising 
that the Ninth Circuit failed to neutrally apply the law to the facts in 
Catholic League. That the court employed this kind of outcome-
driven analysis is especially evident in light of how its opinion 
compares with previous ones. For example, despite a significant 
amount of harsh, angry language directed at the Catholic religion in 
the resolution adopted by the Board, the court insisted that such 
language was not the essence of the resolution; rather, the purpose 
and primary effects of the resolution were secular, and the hostile 
language had to be viewed in context.86 However, although this 
analysis may be mostly in line with the reasoning of American Family 
Ass’n, it does not square well with the court’s controversial Pledge of 
Allegiance decision in Newdow v. Congress,87 where it ruled that a 
mere two words, “under God,” were enough to fail under the Lemon 
test.88 In fact, in that case, the court rejected the idea that it should 
look at the Pledge “as a whole,” declaring that it need only consider 
the original legislation that added the two words to the pledge.89 
The court’s overall treatment of the primary-effects prong of the 
Lemon test also seemed particularly outcome-driven in Catholic 
League. In that section of the opinion, the court sought to ascertain 
the primary effect of the resolution by determining whether it could 
reasonably be construed as “sending primarily a message of . . . 
 
 86. Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 
595, 605–06 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 87. 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 88. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). This original opinion of the 
Ninth Circuit was later amended and reprinted; and in the second version the court reached 
the same result but removed its Lemon test analysis, finding it unnecessary due to the results of 
its application of the “coercion test.” Newdow, 328 F.3d at 487 (9th Cir. 2002). Upon 
subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Newdow was reversed. 
The reversal was based on the plaintiff’s lack of prudential standing, however, so the Supreme 
Court never reached the merits of the case. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004). 
 89. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 610. 
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disapproval.”90 However, the court’s reasoning in making that 
determination largely mirrored its purpose-prong reasoning, raising 
the question of whether the court confused the two. For one thing, 
the court placed significant weight on the resolution’s “focus” of 
promoting and defending homosexual relationships.91 The court also 
looked to the Board’s historically “extensive and persistent practice 
of passing non-binding resolutions denouncing discrimination 
against gays and lesbians,” speculating that an objective observer 
would have understood as much and not taken an anti-religious 
message from the resolution.92 It has been observed, however, that 
“[a]n effect is a result, not a reason.”93 While the Board’s focus and 
history may be indicative of its purpose, it is hard to understand how 
the court was able to use those factors to derive the primary effects 
of the resolution. Either the court was confused, or it simply saw 
what it wanted to see. 
C. Ignoring the Correct Review Standard 
Just as significant as the Ninth Circuit’s results-oriented 
application of the Lemon test was its failure to adhere to the 
appropriate legal standard for review in Catholic League. As noted 
previously, the underlying issue being reviewed on appeal was 
whether the district court was correct in granting the Board’s motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.94 The court clearly understood 
the legal standard it was to apply, because it stated that it must 
“accept the allegations in the complaint as true” and “draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”95 However, the court 
proceeded to ignore that standard in its subsequent analysis. Judge 
Noonan, dissenting in American Family Ass’n, had essentially the 
same complaint. He noted that the court, in that case, did not draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the religious groups as it was 
required to do.96 For example, the court brushed off the strong 
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2002) (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:17 PM 
101 How the Ninth Circuit Abandoned Judicial Neutrality 
 115 
language of the Board’s letter and resolutions that asserted the 
message of the religious groups to be directly correlated with 
violence against homosexuals, suggesting that an objective observer 
would clearly have understood the overall effect of the resolution as 
denouncing hate crimes.97 Additionally, Judge Noonan said, the 
court did not take seriously the idea that the Board’s statements 
could have influenced media organizations to refuse to run the 
religious groups’ advertisements, as the groups had alleged.98 In 
short, according to Judge Noonan, the religious groups were 
entitled to the benefit of the doubt on some of these issues; it was 
not appropriate for the court to decide such questions at the onset of 
the litigation. 
Similarly, in Catholic League, the court’s affirmation of the 
district court’s decision was premature. Although the court was 
arguably justified in its findings that the resolution had a plausible 
secular purpose and did not create excessive entanglement, its 
analysis of the primary-effects factor cannot withstand scrutiny. As 
discussed previously, the court’s reasoning under that prong of the 
test appears to have been outcome-driven; it did not directly examine 
the issue. Instead of considering that the resolution truly had a 
primary religious effect, the court just assumed that an objective 
observer knowing the focus, intent, and history of the Board’s 
actions would have understood that the resolution’s message was not 
primarily religious.99 
What the court should have done, and what it was obligated to 
do, was draw all inferences in favor of Catholic League. Given the 
resolution’s language, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the 
effects of the resolution may well have been primarily religious. The 
resolution directly singled out the Catholic religion, stating that its 
beliefs on adoption were an “insult” to San Franciscans, that they 
were “absolutely unacceptable,” and that “such hateful and 
discriminatory rhetoric is both insulting and callous, and shows a 
level of insensitivity and ignorance which has seldom been 
encountered.”100 This kind of language appeared throughout the 
resolution. If the Board had not filled the resolution with such 
angry, inflammatory language, the primary effects could have more 
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easily been inferred as secular, consistent with the Board’s claimed 
purpose. But because the resolution went well beyond simply 
encouraging adoption by same-sex couples and instead resorted to 
attacking specific religious beliefs, its primary effects are subject to 
question. The court’s analysis would have been more appropriate in 
the context of a properly supported motion for summary judgment 
where discovery had been conducted and documented by affidavit. 
In the context of a pleadings-based motion to dismiss, however, the 
court was required to resolve the question in favor of Catholic 
League. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A close examination of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Catholic 
League reveals that the case was incorrectly decided. The court 
applied a flawed test that does not lend itself well to neutral 
application, used that test to conduct an outcome-driven analysis, 
and failed to adhere to the correct legal standard. Whether these 
issues were ignored intentionally or simply overlooked by the court, 
the result is the same: the Ninth Circuit struck a blow at religion in 
the ongoing culture war. Moreover, the damage done to religious 
freedoms is almost as concerning as the damage the court has 
potentially done to its own legitimacy by abandoning its role of 
neutrality. 
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